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I have been asked to speak on “women and economics” with specific reference to the 
Canadian tax system. It is my thesis that the economic vulnerabilities of women and 
children in this nation are reflected and reinforced in the tax system. Further, it is my 
view that societal attitudes about who should support, and how we should support, 
children contribute to a complex synergy within the economic/tax system. This has the 
potential to produce a new underclass of government dependents who are dependent 
because, paradoxically, they receive so little support. Finally, I end with a plea for a 
broader commitment to all our children, which goes well beyond, and is quite 
incompatible with, those programmes which define some children as a particularly 
problematic subset of the poor.
Before addressing the fundamentally important issues arising out of the tax system, 
I want to consider more generally the past and present positions of women and their 
children in the economic sphere. One place to start is the Report o f the Royal 
Commission on the Status o f Women which celebrated its twenty-sixth anniversary in 
the fall of 1996.1 In a recent retrospective on the Report, broadcast on the CBC, it was 
interesting to hear the impressions of the women intimately involved with its drafting 
and the aftermath. One woman’s impression was that the easy things got done quickly, 
and the politicians reaped their reward, but difficult issues of economic welfare remain 
unresolved. Today women and their children still suffer disproportionately from limited 
economic opportunities, poverty and their concomitant evils.2
Actually, and perhaps surprising to us today, the Royal Commission had virtually 
nothing to say about macro-economic conditions. The Commission was constituted in 
a much more benign economic climate.3 There was an optimism and expectation of 
generosity that sounds strange to our ears today. Cost estimates were in short supply 
in the report. Those given were unapologetic.
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It is true that things have changed since then. Women now make 72 cents for every 
dollar a man makes compared to 60 cents in 1971 -  a significant, if not sufficient, 
improvement.4 Indeed, in recent years, as our families have been under siege from 
unemployment, downsizing, and public sector cuts, some women’s wages have 
increased as those of men have decreased or have been eliminated (although this trend 
appears to have recently been reversed).5 Further, the work participation rate of women 
with young children has increased from about 34% in 1971 to 63% today.6 Given the 
state of day care in this country, and the implications of the double shift for women and 
the care of their children, I do not think these changes, however constituted, are an 
unmitigated blessing for families.7
Today we face a profoundly changed economic landscape. Parts of it are bleak and 
harsh barrens, populated with women and children who have no place, no value and 
sometimes no home in the new global economy. It is a land of autonomous, self- 
actualizing and wealth-maximizing market participants.8 Women know they do not fit 
into this landscape. They do not need to be told that the opposite of the self- 
actualization of the profit maximizer is the self-abnegation of pregnancy and 
motherhood. Few women would understand the responsibility of looking after their 
children as altruism in the self-actualizing market sense.9
In this landscape, women face a fearful political ideology which reinforces the 
economic one. Demands for less government and, in their extreme form, pressures to 
dismantle the welfare state, reductions in the social safety net, and a new economic 
punitiveness underline the vulnerability of women and children.10 In Canada today the 
question — who is looking after the kids? — may reasonably be asked. The answer is 
ominous. More women are working to make ends meet and this increased workforce
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participation has not been met with a societal commitment to universal day care.11 
Furthermore, many children in Canada today can expect to spend a significant period 
in a one-parent family. Most of these families are headed by women12 and over 44% 
of mother-lead families live below the poverty line.13 It is noteworthy that the depth of 
their poverty is the greatest of all categories of poor people.14
Our societal response to this barren landscape has been wanting. What we have 
seen in the last ten years is the end of universality in Canada.15 Under the twin rubrics 
of affordability and efficiency, the social welfare system increasingly “targets” its 
recipients. The risk is declining political support and ultimately beggarly benefits.
The tax system cannot, of course, be separated out from the economic landscape. 
It influences and is influenced by that landscape. The present contours and future 
shapes of either may not bode well for the future -  if the future is one of a functioning 
and effective welfare state. It is a landscape in which we can easily get lost. It is true 
that we must find our way to a fair and efficient tax system. However, as we focus on 
who should pay, we should not forget what we are paying for. We need a tax system 
that will support necessary investments in human capital, our mothers and kids, today 
and tomorrow. While there are limits to our capacity to pay, there are also limits to the 
viability of poorly resourced health, education, child care and social welfare systems.
Before examining provisions of the Income Tax Act of particular significance to 
women, I want to discuss the tax system as whole. I will refer to a few trends which
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I find significant and problematic. They include the development of a hybrid system 
of taxation in Canada which is neither a consumption tax system nor an income tax 
system, the trend towards flattening tax rates, and finally, the emphasis on efficiency 
over equity.
I will comment first on the generous incentives for savings, particularly — but not 
exclusively — retirement savings, under our present income tax system. To reiterate my 
earlier point, most discussions of the income tax system focus on who should bear the 
tax burden. Many writings have been devoted to finding a principled justification for 
taxation. Some justifications concentrate on who benefits from civil society. This is 
a hard question to answer because defense, hospitals, education, transport, and other 
government services seem to cross gender and class lines. In the final analysis, those 
whose economic life is most enhanced by the presence of civil society, that is law, 
arguably benefit the most and, as a corollary, should pay the most tax. Nevertheless, 
among those who debate these issues, there has been a tendency to ascribe economic, 
if not civic, virtue to those who save over those who consume.16 Therefore, in the 
debate over whether we should have income taxes or consumption taxes, consumption 
taxes are often favoured.
Actually both systems have their merits, and both can, at least theoretically, be 
devised to provide equitable tax systems. However, in the Income Tax Act, we seem, 
in fits and starts, to be developing a hybrid system.17 Furthermore, the introduction of 
the GST, even with the GST credit, accentuates the tendency to exact a disproportionate 
amount of tax from those who consume more. Consumers include those who have high 
expenses, such as children, or low incomes, or both. This tendency to favour savings 
was demonstrated in the 1997 budget when parents who could afford to contribute to 
a registered education plan, and who furthermore could afford to set up their own 
private plans, were further privileged by being allowed to shelter unused investment 
income from their plans from taxation.18
Another aspect of the income tax system that women should be subjecting to 
scrutiny is the trend towards rate reduction.19 In many of the countries of the 
industrialized world, governments have adopted the mantra of international 
competitiveness for their tax systems. This has been interpreted to mean lower rates of
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tax in both the personal and corporate sectors. Lowering rates has been touted as the 
way to increased savings and investment, and the creation of wealth. Cast in a slightly 
cynical light, we are told, in effect, that if we just let the rich get richer than we will all 
be better off, or at least we will all get poorer more slowly.
It is interesting to note that the disincentive effects of higher tax rates are not 
universally, or even generally, accepted by professional economists.20 Although there 
are studies that argue for these disincentive effects, the jury is still out.21 Who is to say 
whether I will work more or less under any specific rate regime? I might get 
discouraged and reduce my hours of work or I might work more to maintain my 
standard of living. There are two questions with respect to savings. The first is whether 
higher taxes act as a disincentive to save. But even if higher tax rates discourage 
savings, it is not clear in an open economy like Canada, that savings promote growth 
and employment.
The final, more general, comment I want to make about taxes is the change in 
emphasis from equity to efficiency. I believe we can still look to the Report o f the 
Royal Commission on Taxation, a document from the 1960s.22 It articulated principles 
of taxation which we could do well to remember. To quote from volume one of the
Report:
We assign a higher priority to the objective of equity than to all others. ... We are 
convinced that unless this objective is achieved to a high degree all other achievements 
are of little account.
Unless a tax system is generally accepted as fair, the fundamental purpose o f taxation 
is lost; for if fairness is not considered relevant there are certainly simpler means for 
the government to secure command over goods and services.23
Times have changed. Consider the comments of the Macdonald Royal Commission 
on the Economy:
While equity remains an important goal, tax specialists now stress the need for a system 
that is calculated to encourage economic efficiency.24
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Tax fairness based on ability to pay is now out of fashion.25 In the late Doug 
Hartle’s words:
[0]ne [would] not expect “tax specialists” to emphasize efficiency arguments for the 
simple reason that they purport to have special knowledge about efficiency issues but 
no greater insight into equity issues than anyone else?26
At this point, having had the opportunity to examine the economic landscape and 
some of the general contours of the tax system, I will examine provisions of particular 
concern to women. I will identify three areas that raise questions about how we view 
women’s economic and social natures. These areas are the deductibility of child care 
expenses, the non-deductibility (as of 1 April 1997) of child support, and the Child Tax 
Benefit.
The first provision that I will refer to is the child care expenses deduction.27 Section 
63 allows a deduction of $5,000 per child for children under seven,28 and $3,000 per 
child for children between seven and sixteen.29 The deduction cannot exceed two-thirds 
of a taxpayer’s earned income,30 and it can only be taken by the lower earner in a two 
earner couple.31 In 75% of the cases, Revenue Canada states that the person claiming 
the deduction is a woman.32
I see a number of problems associated with the child care expenses deduction. My 
views, however, are not completely congruent with conventional tax theorists. 
Therefore, before discussing the provision, I will situate it within mainstream tax policy. 
Basically, the argument of tax theorists, and some feminists has been that the present 
tax system discourages secondary earner’s (read women’s) participation in the market 
place.33 This is, among other things, the consequence of the non-taxation of home 
production. In other words, if I bake my bread and care for my own children then I am 
not taxed on this “production”. If buy my bread in a store and pay someone to care for 
my children, however, then I pay with taxed (after-tax) money. The result, therefore, 
is that some women may be discouraged from entering the waged economy. The
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solution is to ameliorate the costs of substituting home production with market 
production; hence, deductions like those for child care expenses. The child care 
expenses deduction permits the woman who cares for her own children and the woman 
who pays someone to care for her children to be put on the same tax footing.
There are a number of things wrong with this approach. Nonetheless, I am not 
advocating the complete elimination of the child care expenses deduction at this time. 
Even Katie Cooke rather reluctantly agreed to some role for such a deduction.34 
Furthermore, at the present time, the deduction represents the primary source of 
government funding for child care in this country.35 However, it should be understood 
that the deduction is seriously and fundamentally flawed.
A very specific criticism of the child care expenses deduction is that it embodies a 
perverse characteristic that is called an “upside-down subsidy.”36 In other words, the 
richer you are, the more the government will subsidize your child care; the poorer you 
are, the less it will subsidize your child care unless you are really poor, in which case 
it will refuse to provide any subsidy at all. This is the result of the increasing marginal 
tax rates of taxpayers. A $ 1,000 deduction to a taxpayer whose marginal rate (MR) of 
tax is 50% is worth $500. The same deduction to a taxpayer whose MR of tax is 30% 
is worth $300, and it is worth nothing at all to someone whose income is so low that she 
is not taxable.
Consider, for example, a woman lawyer working out of her own office. She may 
spend $16,000 a year on a nanny, which, assuming she has two children under 7, would 
give her a deduction of $10,000. In turn, the deduction might be worth approximately 
$5,000 at her top marginal rate. Her receptionist, who also has two children under 
seven, might be able to put in place a fragile network of unlicenced or family care, or 
both. She might pay her sister-in-law $3,000. Her deduction would be worth $900 to 
her, assuming a marginal rate of 30%. The cleaning lady, who works at night so she
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can have a neighbor look in on the kids while they sleep, pays about $500 a year for 
which she does not get a receipt, and therefore cannot deduct, even assuming she has 
taxable income. Government support for her child care is zero. One could say that the 
cleaning woman is invisible in more ways than one.
The extension of the child care expenses deduction so that it is available for all 
child care expenses would, of course, only exaggerate these perverse effects. In Symes 
v. The Queeni37 the plaintiff argued for the complete deduction of her nanny’s salary, 
amounting to between $10,075 and $13,173 a year from 1982 to 1984.38 She contended 
that the Income Tax Act, by not permitting her to deduct all her child care expenses, 
violated women’s equality rights guaranteed under the Charter. From Ms. Symes 
perspective, child care expenses for her were like business expenses for men and 
women. And yet, from another perspective, Ms. Symes was a favoured professional 
who paid for and received “carriage trade” child care. Further, her success was likely 
to assist only about 2% of other women.39 Ms. Symes lost on narrow technical grounds 
that need not concern us here. Much was made at the time, however, of the fact that the 
two dissenting judges who supported the plaintiff were women.
But, is this the way we want to go? Even Madame Justice L’Heureux-Dubé had her 
doubts. She said:
I am not unaware that income tax deductions are undoubtedly not the best way for the
government to provide assistance with regard to the high cost of child care...
Perhaps child care should not even be subsidized through the tax system but, rather,
provided for in another manner.40
Should we be seduced by market talk in attempts to ameliorate the proven problems 
of child care? I must confess that I am profoundly disturbed by the conceptionalization 
of the care of children as a business expense. Such talk risks recasting child care as a 
private problem with a completely private solution.41
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Of course the child care expenses deduction itself could be reformed to take out the 
nastier aspects. And indeed, there have been detailed and thoughtful proposals in 
favour of some form of a refundable tax credit.42 My point is, nevertheless, that the 
income tax system is not a good vehicle for providing child care. We should not be 
distracted from our main task, which is to support a fair tax system that will raise 
enough revenue to finance the social, educational and medical programmes that we and 
our children need. Further, we must resist the allure of tax deductions or transfers 
which will undermine our will and our ability to finance a universal, publicly-funded 
day care system accessible to all children.
Finally, I return to the analysis of some tax theorists. Their assumption, it must be 
emphasized, is that the economic vulnerability of women will be mitigated by more 
workplace attachment, so that deductions such as the child care expenses deduction 
must be a good thing. I will agree that the provision of subsidized child care is good 
because it gives women and children more options. However, tying child care so 
closely to jobs and income leaves a lot of women and children out in the cold.
I turn now to the new child support guidelines and the revised tax rules governing 
them which shall take effect in April.43 It is not my intention to comment specifically 
on the guidelines, but I do want to address the changes in the tax rules that will govern 
the new regime. The present, soon-to-be-changed deduction/inclusion system permits 
the payor (usually Dad) to deduct child support payments made to Mom, who has to 
include them in her income.44 The theory, to which I shall refer later, is that Dad has 
the higher MR of tax and Mom pays little or no tax. Hence, if he deducts and she 
includes there is an overall tax saving which, at minimum, should, but does not have to 
be, shared between the parents.
It is interesting to note that the soon-to-be-changed system was originally 
introduced in 1942 to give fathers a tax break. It was the opinion of the then Minister 
of Finance, J. L. Ilsley, that since divorce was permitted in very limited circumstances 
— remember this was in the middle of the social dislocation of WWII — it was only fair 
that the costs to a man of supporting two families should be recognized in the tax 
system.45 It was only after many years of the operation of the deduction/inclusion 
system that the present focus on the woman’s household developed.
However you look at it, the deduction/inclusion system’s justification is based on 
a characterization of familial relations seen on TV when I was growing up. The
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deduction/inclusion system was, I guess, a more modem take on Father Knows Best. 
Dad has left but he still can, and is, willing to support the family. Mom can, and is, 
willing to stay home and look after the kids.
Events have repainted this picture. There are many more family roles and family 
configurations, as we can see from the sitcoms today.46 Indeed, as the Court found in 
the Thibaudeau case,47 the soon-to-be-changed system could -  even theoretically — 
benefit just over half of separated couples and their children. Women now work outside 
the home as well as in it (the so-called double shift), and approximately fifteen percent 
of women in dual income households earn more than their husbands.48 Many others 
make enough market income that there is no substantial income differential and hence 
no significant income split.49 Furthermore, and very importantly, even in those 
circumstances where the income differential is such that the deduction/inclusion system 
would be an advantage to separated partners and their children, there is no mechanism 
in the system to ensure that benefits are shared between the former partners and 
children. Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that the benefits were not shared, with 
men pocketing most of the tax subsidy.
Again we see, as we did in the child care expenses deduction, the difficulties of 
using indirect benefits from the tax system to provide essentials for women and 
children. The system does not work, and is illogical when applied to necessities. We 
have already discussed the upside-down subsidy inherent in the child care expenses 
deduction. The same effect is obtained with the deduction/inclusion system, but the 
irrationality is further compounded by the fact that the overall tax saving will depend 
on the relative incomes of the former partners. In layperson’s language, the tax subsidy 
to divided households will go to the richest dads with the poorest wives and children, 
and yet those dads are under no obligation to share the tax subsidy with their kids.
Given all these criticisms that I have made of the soon-to-be-changed 
deduction/inclusion system, you might be forgiven for thinking that I support the soon- 
to-be-introduced system of no deduction for Dad and no inclusion for Mom. However, 
serious concerns about these changes do linger.50
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My first concern is that in the process of legislative change, the government has 
further withdrawn from responsibility for children. The dreary statistics about the 
poverty of single-parent families are well known. As previously mentioned, over 60% 
of female-headed single parent families live below the poverty line.51 Not only do they 
live in poverty, but as a group they are the poorest of the poor. On average these single 
parents live over $8,000 below the poverty line.52 Although the withdrawal of the tax 
burden from the shoulders of some of these parents may help in the short term, the real 
long term solution is not in the tax system. We need a national commitment to all 
children.53 Poor children deserve our first attention and greatest efforts. But all 
children, as I shall argue later, deserve our support.
Secondly, I am uncomfortable with the non-taxation of child support. This is 
because women with the same means to support their children will pay different 
amounts of tax. Women who are not fortunate enough to have their partner assist with 
the costs of child-raising will have insult added to injury by having to pay more taxes 
than other women who receive tax free child support. I am not convinced that this is 
a matter we can, or should, ignore. It is unfair. The solution, of course, is to subsidize 
(because non-taxation is a subsidy) all children.
I turn finally to Mr. Martin’s 1997 budget, the child tax benefit, and some proposed 
changes.54 It is interesting that tax theorists have for many years had an ongoing debate 
over exactly where children fit into the tax system. Consider, for example, the 
hypothetical justification for a child care deduction described by one academic. To 
paraphrase, if you buy a baby elephant and it needs elephant-sitting, in the absence of 
an elephant-sitter, it can always be sent back to the zoo.55 You cannot send kids back 
to the zoo -  although I am sure most parents have sometimes felt that way about their 
offspring.
51 Statistics Canada, supra note 4 at 85.
52Ibid.
51Note the House o f Commons Debates (24 November 1989) at 6173. Hon. Edward Broadbent (Oshawa) 
moved:
That this House express its concern for the more than one million Canadian children currently 
living in poverty and seek to achieve the goal o f eliminating poverty among Canadian children by 
the year 2000.
Passed Unanimously
One in five Canadian children under 18 years o f age -  1.4 million children -  lived in poverty in 1994, 
four years after this resolution was passed. The Progress o f Canada’s Children 1996 (Ottawa: Canadian 
Council o f Social Development, 1996) at 7.
54Income Tax Act, supra note 15, ss. 122.6 - 122.64.
55M.J. McIntyre, “Evaluating the New Tax Credit for Child Care and Maid Service” (1977) 5 Tax Notes 7 at
8 cited in supra note 38 at 61.
The fact that we even make such arguments reveals our profound ambivalence 
about our collective responsibility for the care and nurturing of children which, of 
course, includes economic ways and means. In the child care expenses deduction, and 
both the old and new ways of taxing child support, we see aid to children as irrational, 
ineffective and inadequate.
The provisions in the Income Tax System reflect the absence of a national policy 
about families.56 In Canada, policies about families tend to be policies about poverty. 
Even our rhetoric is revealing. We do not support families. We support poor children, 
as if they exist alone in space. In European countries, we find explicit commitments to 
families, commitments that in the tax and tax transfer sphere put considerable emphasis 
on horizontal equity.57 In other words, the costs of raising children are recognized and 
as between two units with the same income, the unit with children will pay considerably 
less tax than the unit without children, no matter what the income of the units of 
comparison. In Canada, on the other hand, the Child Tax Benefit begins to phase out 
at very low income levels, approximately $26,000 for household income.58 At the 
average income level of Canadian households, benefits are insignificant unless there is 
an unusually high number of children.59 Fifteen percent of families with children do not 
benefit from even a nominal amount.60
Economist call this narrow focusing of benefits “targeting.” The argument is that 
when programmes are “targeted”, only children who “need” benefits will receive them. 
Benefits will not be “wasted” on families with children who are not in dire straits. At 
higher income levels, the choice, as they say in the ad, is yours. You can have one 
Ford Escort and two kids or buy a Lamborghini instead. In either case, your tax 
position is the same.
It is important at this point that I reiterate my statement that our first priority has to 
be the unacceptable economic circumstances of many women and their children. 
Nevertheless, I am not prepared to throw over a societal commitment to all children. 
My reasons are both idealistic and pragmatic. Idealistic because I have a vision of an 
inclusive community that, where appropriate, transcends market values, and pragmatic 
because targeted benefits, despite the rhetoric, are often beggarly benefits. 
Furthermore, I should emphasize that even untargeted benefits do not bestow benefits
5hP. Girard, “Why Canada has No Family Polity: Lessons from France and Italy” (1994) 32 Osgoode Hall L.J. 
579.
slIbid.
58Income Tax Act, supra note 15, s. 122.61(1).
59 A family with $45,000 of income and two children over seven will receive less than $1,200 a year. Finance
Canada, Working Together Towards a National Child Benefit System (Ottawa: Public Works and Government 
Services Canada, 1997) at 18 and 12.
on the undeserving rich holus bolus. The benefits are taxed in just the same way as 
other income, such as wages or interest income. Under the old family allowance 
regime,61 taxable benefits, except for the last few years when they were targeted,62 were 
given to the mothers of all children, with the largest benefits going to the poorest -  
which appears to be a reasonable result.
A dollar of the child tax benefit is a special kind of dollar. It is taxed much more 
heavily than dollars from dividends or interest from GICs or salary.63 In addition, 
because the child tax benefit is so heavily taxed, it adds to the constellation of social 
welfare benefits that contribute to the so-called poverty trap. One aspect of the poverty 
trap is that the highest rates of tax are generally borne by some of the lowest-income 
Canadians. Canadians with incomes below $20,000 a year are often taxed at near 
confiscatory rates.64
This raises another important aspect of the child tax benefit. Because the child tax 
benefit bears such a heavy rate of tax, as does social assistance payments, ways have 
to be found to encourage families to accept waged work if they can find it. Thus the 
working income supplement (WIS) was introduced in the 1996 budget which 
discriminates between poor children whose parents work in the waged workforce, and 
poor children whose parent or parents either cannot find work or simply believe in the 
importance of a parental presence in the lives of their younger children.65 While I 
understand the attempt to replace some of the benefits lost when parents move off social 
assistance, I deplore the potential to distinguish, almost in Dickensian terms, between 
the deserving and the not-so-deserving poor.66 In any case, the answer lies in the 
elimination of economically abusive social welfare systems.67 Women forced to live 
in desperate economic straits do not bootstrap themselves to economic or social 
independence. It is only when the basic necessities are provided that these women can 
be better parents and if need be, and I say this with some ambivalence about women 
with small children, wage-eamers.
I end as I began, with a reference to the Report o f the Royal Commission on the 
Status o f Women.™ During the course of writing this paper I reread the Report’s chapter
'"Family Allowance Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-l as rep. by S.C. 1992, c. 48 s. 31(1).
62Income Tax Act as amended by S.C. 1990, c. 39, s. 48.
61 Income Tax Act, supra note 15, s. 122.61(1).
MThis assumes that any reduction in social welfare benefits is a tax.
65Income Tax Act, supra note 15, s. 122.61(1).
**.Ibid.
A7See for example, Family Benefits Act, R. S.N.S. 1989, c. 158. The maximum monthly benefit for a parent 
and two young children in Nova Scotia as of April 1,1997 is $1,048.
^ Supra note 1.
on Women in the Canadian Economy several times.69 Underlying the chapter was an 
implicit understanding that if specific barriers to women’s participation in the economy 
were eliminated, then women would be equal economic partners. Well, a lot of those 
barriers have been eliminated, and we are not equal partners and our children suffer.70
As I said before, times have changed. I have attempted to demonstrate in this paper 
that global economies and the ideology of the market require comprehensive strategies 
in support of women and their children. Although specific economic and tax provisions 
do matter, we should not allow ourselves to be distracted to the detriment of the focus 
on the main game. First, there must be a commitment to children in their families.
